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INTRODUCTION
In 1859, Charles Darwin wrote:
If it could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been
formed for the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory,
for such could not have been produced through natural selection .
—The Origin of Species, Chapter 6
This was a bold prediction indeed! Many species were known to provide one an-
other with benefits, and a good fraction of these appeared to have evolved elabo-
rate mechanisms by which to do so. The evolutionary study of interspecific
mutualism— defined as mutually positive interactions between species — aims
to explain such observations by identifying the direct or indirect benefits that ac-
crue to an actor from the actions that benefit its partner.
Ahundred and forty years after Darwin stepped out onto this proverbial limb,
where do we stand? Has the branch given way under the weight of his bold pre-
diction, or has the branch held firm as theory and observation remain in close ac-
cord? Have we addressed Darwin’s challenge to our full satisfaction, or do we
need to seek new principles by which to explain the full range of observed inter-
actions? More specifically, what observations do we need to explain, and what
explanations do we have to offer? In this report, we describe the major concep-
tual foundations that are applied to the study of mutualism, and we ask what
questions remain unanswered.
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MAJOR QUESTIONS
To provide a thorough and satisfying evolutionary explanation of a given phe-
nomenon, we typically need to identify mechanisms responsible for two sepa-
rate processes: First, how did the phenomenon of interest initially arise? Second,
what prevents its dissolution once established? These two questions stand at the
center of the study of mutualism and comprise our first two major questions in
the field of mutualism:
• By what processes do mutualisms form?
• How do mutualisms persist over time, despite the ever-present threat of
exploitation from within or by third parties?
Beyond obtaining a basic answer to each of these problems, we would like to be
able to say at least something about how the ecological and evolutionary context
affects the biological outcomes observed. In essence, we seek to understand how
the properties of mutualisms change in response to changes in underlying pa-
rameters. In general, we would like to know:
• What factors promote or inhibit the formation and persistence of
mutualisms?
• What factors influence the partitioning of benefits between the mutualist
partners?
All of these questions can be addressed on both ecological and evolutionary
timescales. For example, if we ask how mutualisms are formed, we can explore
how partners find one another in real time and how the ecological dynamics of
growth and dispersal act to structure the patterns of mutualistic association in
time and space. Alternatively, we could explore the processes by which novel
mutualisms arise over evolutionary time among previously unassociated spe-
cies pairs or out of other forms of interspecies interaction (e.g., parasitism; see
Table 13.4). In this report we focus primarily on what happens over evolutionary
time; however, we recognize the crucial importance (and ultimate interdepen-
dence) of both scales.
THE RANGE OF MUTUALISMS
Biological mutualisms span such a broad range of natural histories and evolu-
tionary origins that mutualism as a concept cannot easily be shoehorned into any
simple, single situational template. For this reason, it would be a tremendous
stretch to argue that any particular system is itself the “archetypal” mutualism.
That said, would it even be useful to consider mutualisms as a class of interac-
tions delimited by a set of common features and subject to some single concep-
tual framework? A pessimist might answer “no” and argue that mutualism is a
catch-all category, an unrelated grab bag of interactions with no hope for con-
ceptual unification.
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We, the authors (or at least some subset thereof), prefer a more optimistic
view: Mutualism represents an ecologically, evolutionarily, and taxonomically
rich spectrum of biological phenomena that remain in large part unexplored or
even undescribed. By identifying the salient structural features of mutualistic in-
teractions — both those features relevant to the nature of the interaction in real
time and those relevant to the ontogeny of the mutualism on an evolutionary
scale — we should ultimately be able to highlight relevant connections among
these diverse systems. Moreover, we expect the diversity of mutualistic systems
to manifest these various structural features in a multiplicity of combinations,
creating a network of relationships whereby any pair of different mutualisms
share some characters in common and differ in others. In Table 13.1, we list
some of the key features that we consider to be important in determining the na-
ture, outcome, and evolutionary history of mutualistic systems. Any one
mutualism is characterized by a number of features from this list, and different
pairs have different features in common (an ideal situation in which to take a
comparative approach to understanding the consequences of game structure!)
In Table 13.2, we briefly summarize a few of the better-studied examples of
mutualism and describe them in terms of combinations of the properties listed in
Table 13.1. Among the various types of mutualism listed in Table 13.2, only in
the shared-benefit mutualisms do all individuals, regardless of species, contrib-
ute the same good. In these mutualisms, there is not really a trading market
(Bowles and Hammerstein, this volume; Bshary and Noë, this volume) at all,
nor can a “price” or “exchange rate” be computed. Instead, these shared benefit
mutualisms typically involve exchange (or production) of information . The
laws governing information-sharing work differently from those governing the
exchange of ordinary physical commodities, for information can be transferred
to another without reducing that enjoyed by the donor (Lachmann et al.2001).
CONCEPTUAL TOOLS AND FOUNDATIONS
In the field of intraspecific cooperation, theoretical foundations (e.g., Hamilton
1964; Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) developed alongside empiri-
cal observation and experimentation. The study of mutualism biology has had
quite a different history; this history may in part explain the relation (or lack
thereof!) between theory and empirical work in this area. The study of
mutualism largely arose out of efforts to understand the elaborate natural histo-
ries of species pairs interacting to their mutual benefit (e.g., Buchner 1965;
Janzen 1966). When theorists first began to take note of the “mutualism prob-
lem,” they brought with them a body of conceptual and mathematical models
largely developed within other disciplines. The theory of reciprocal altruism,
based largely on models of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, was an
early colonist, having been imported from the study of intraspecific coopera-
tion. More recently, a second wave of theoretical concepts — market theory and
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a suite of related ideas — has been imported from the field of economics. In this
section, we consider these and other conceptual foundations for understanding
mutualistic interactions.
To understand the relations among these core concepts, we find it helpful to
distinguish clearly between the structure of the pair formation, on one hand, and
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Properties of the Game Payoffs
1. Magnitude of benefits: The benefit that members of a given species reap from
their participation in a mutualism can range from marginally greater than zero to
an opposite extreme in which all fitness comes through the mutualism, as is the
case for obligate mutualists.
2. Magnitude of investment: For each partner, investment can range from nothing to
enormous; investments can be fixed at the onset of the interaction or variable
across its course; investments can be symmetric or asymmetric between partners;
investments can be concealed, revealed, or even extravagantly signaled.
3. Cost of being cheated: The consequences of a partner’s defection range from
negligible to fatal.
4. Potential for sanction: Some species may be able to impose substantial costs on
their mutualist partners; others will have little opportunity to negatively influ-
ence their associates.
Availability of “Outside Options”
5. Obligacy: Mutualistic association can increase an individual’s fitness from a
baseline of zero (in obligate mutualisms) or from something greater than zero (in
facultative mutualisms).
6. Specificity: Some mutualisms feature only one partner species for each species
(species-specific mutualism); in others, partner species are substitutable such
that any of a number of species may be able to step into a partner role (nonspecific
mutualism).
7. Opportunity for choice: Partner choice can range from highly important to
nonexistent.
Ecological Structure and Evolutionary Dynamics
8. Population structure: Partners may be clumped or spread evenly across the habi-
tat; there may or may not be significant genetic structure across space.
9. Symmetry: Both obligacy and specialization can be symmetrical between part-
ners or asymmetrical (e.g., obligate on one side, facultative on the other).
10. Duration of association: The durations of mutualistic associations can range from
single-shot and fleeting encounters to life-long partnerships with highly iterated
interactions.
11. Influence of third parties: Though typically modeled as dyadic interactions,
mutualisms commonly involve third species that influence the outcome or mag-
nitude of the mutualism. The third species may be responsible for raising (or even
creating) the benefits of the mutualism. Alternatively, it may lower the benefits
and/or stability of the mutualism by exploitation.
12. Evolutionary rate: Mutualist partners may have similar or widely divergent gen-
eration times and evolutionary rates.
Table 13.1 Key variables that differ across mutualisms.
the population-genetic structure in which mutualistic phenotypes and behaviors
evolve, on the other. The former essentially concerns the number of separate
classes or categories from which partnerships are assembled. Are mutualist
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Protection Mutualisms
General features: Mutualistic only in the presence of third species (antagonists of one
partner); protection traded for food
Examples: • Cleaning: (Bshary and Noë, this volume): Generalized; faculta-
tive; extensive and reciprocal partner choice and partner-recogni-
tion mechanisms; high cognitive abilities; minimal investment
• Ant-tending of lycaenids (Bronstein, this volume; Leimar and
Connor, this volume): Range from generalized to specialized,
from obligate to facultative, from mutualistic to parasitic; partner
recognition at least by ants; adaptively plastic reward production
ranging from cheap to expensive
Similar mutualisms: Ant-tending of aphids, ant-tending of plants
Transportation Mutualisms
General features: Food traded for transport of self or gametes
Examples: • Obligate pollination of yuccas (Bronstein, this volume): Symmet-
rically obligate and species-specific; high reward investment,
fixed before onset of interaction; costly exploitation by mutualists
and other species
• Generalized pollination: Varying symmetry of obligacy and speci-
ficity; reward investment fixed before outset of interaction; ex-
ploitation by mutualists and other species that varies widely in
costs.
Similar mutualisms: Obligate pollination of figs; generalized seed dispersal
Nutrition Mutualisms
General features: Food traded for food/protection; often but not always symbiotic
Examples: • Plant–mycorrhizal symbiosis: Varying symmetry of obligacy and
specificity; can range from mutualistic to parasitic across species
and across gradients of resource availability for individual species
pairs; at least one-sided partner choice
Similar mutualisms: Plant–rhizobium symbiosis; light organ symbioses; gut symbioses
Shared-benefit Mutualisms
General features: Multispecies aggregations that benefit participants via shared vigi-
lance or defense
Examples: • Mixed-species foraging: Highly facultative and generalized; neg-
ligible investment; may involve more than two species simulta-
neously
Similar mutualisms: Müllerian mimicry complexes
Table 13.2 Well-studied empirical systems and some phenomena they exemplify.
pairs composed of individuals paired from each of two mutually exclusive
groups (e.g., mating pairs of one male and one female; cleaning mutualistic pairs
composed of one cleaner species and one client species), or are they drawn from
one homogeneous class (e.g., coalition partners taken from the set of all individ-
uals in a population)? The structure of pair formation can play a significant role
in determining the nature of the interaction as well as the structure and stability
of the pairing (see e.g., the two-sided matching literature: Roth and Sotomayer
1990; Bergstrom and Real 2000).
We contrast this to the structure of the gene pool in which the cooperative
strategies evolve. Do both partners belong to a common gene pool (as is the case
in examples of intraspecific cooperation), or is each pair composed of one mem-
ber from each of two separate populations (as is the case in interspecific
mutualism)? This distinction can be crucial in determining the evolutionary dy-
namics by which strategies are ultimately selected. In Table 13.3, we summarize
the possible combinations of pairing structure and gene pool structure, and pro-
vide biological examples of each combination. Four basic theoretical frame-
works used to understand mutualism evolution are described below.
Reciprocity
As mentioned above, reciprocal altruism was an early — and largely unsuccess-
ful — invader from intraspecific cooperation theory. In his treatment of reci-
procity, Trivers (1971) gave a detailed account of cleaning symbiosis and argued
that the phenomenon is likely to be an example of interspecific reciprocal altru-
ism. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) extended this theoretical stance, by applying
the repeated PD game to interspecific interactions. In addition to cleaning sym-
biosis, Axelrod and Hamilton suggested a range of applications covering most
of the general categories of mutualism listed in Table 13.2. Both Trivers (1971)
and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) stressed the importance of detecting and pun-
ishing cheaters: an individual must not be able to get away with defection with-
out others being able to retaliate effectively.
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Partner Classes Gene Pools Example
1 1 Coalition formation among baboons (Noë 1994)
2 1 Lazuli bunting“tenant” system (Bowles and
Hammerstein, this volume)
Biparental care (Clutton-Brock 1991)
1 2 Mixed flock aggregations (Lima 1995)
2 2 Cleaning mutualisms (Bshary and Noë, this volume)
Protection mutualisms (Bronstein, this volume)
Pollination mutualisms (Bronstein, this volume)
Table 13.3 Types of cooperative interaction.
The papers by Trivers (1971) and by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) came to
be regarded as providing a general conceptual foundation for the evolution of
cooperation between unrelated individuals, between as well as within species.
However, this position has in turn resulted in a growing discontent among biolo-
gists interested in the evolution of mutualism. The perceived weakness of the
theory of reciprocal altruism is not that the logic of the arguments supporting it
appear faulty, but rather that there appear to be few examples of reciprocal altru-
ism that have held up to closer scrutiny (e.g., Bronstein, this volume; Bshary and
Noë, this volume; Hammerstein, Chapter 5, this volume; Leimar and Connor,
this volume). Thus, it would seem that Tit-for-Tat reciprocity is a logically feasi-
ble, but in practice marginal, form of interspecific cooperation.
By-product Effects and Pseudoreciprocity
Certain traits or behaviors that have evolved to benefit an individual directly
might also benefit others, as a side effect of their primary function. For example,
Müllerian mimics receive by-product benefits from one another, as members of
one species “train” predators to avoid other similarly colored and similarly dan-
gerous species as well. Such by-product benefits may have been instrumental
for the evolutionary origin of many existing mutualisms (Connor 1995).
Nevertheless, all benefits of mutualism cannot be regarded as by-products of
other activities. Many costly traits, such as nectar production, must be inter-
preted as investments that primarily benefit other organisms and, as suggested in
the introduction, these are the traits that most desperately need to be explained
by any successful evolutionary theory of mutualism.
Reciprocal altruism provides a candidate explanatory framework, but as we
have noted it appears to have limited applicability. Pseuodoreciprocity — that
idea that investments in unrelated individuals have evolved to enhance by-prod-
uct benefits obtained from these individuals — may be a more common explana-
tion for both the origin and the maintenance of mutualistic associations.
Investment in by-product benefits could have played a role for the origin of cer-
tain mutualisms. For example, Tilman (1978) discovered that ants that are at-
tracted to extrafloral nectaries on black cherry trees reduced herbivore damage
from caterpillars. Apparently, this reduction in herbivory was the by-product
benefit that favored investment in the ants by the trees, in the form of nectar pro-
duction. Such investment is likely to be of even greater importance for the fur-
ther adaptive modification of mutualistic interactions, whether derived from
by-product benefits or from initially parasitic interactions (Table 13.4). Leimar
and Connor (this volume) argue that pseudoreciprocity should replace reciproc-
ity as the dominant explanatory framework for the evolution of investments in
unrelated individuals.
Markets and Partner Choice
The term “biological market” was introduced to highlight the commonalities
among human economic markets, mating markets, and cooperation markets
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(Noë and Hammerstein 1994, 1995). In human markets, buyers are “choosy”:
they seek out sellers who offer the best prices. This choosiness pressures sellers
to compete with one another to offer lower prices, thus forming a crucial link be-
tween supply, demand, and the exchange ratio of commodities. As Bshary and
Noë (this volume) illustrate for cleaner fish – client interactions, the same pro-
cess and basic principles apply to nonhuman systems as well; market theory can
be used to understand the flow of resources among any organisms that exchange
commodities that they cannot take from one another by force.
The biological market approach has two major goals:
1. To explain adaptations in organisms involved in cooperation or
mutualism that are due to “market selection,” i.e., that have evolved un-
der the pressure of partner choice. The obvious parallel is the evolution of
secondary sexual characters driven by mate choice.
2. To predict changes in exchange rates of commodities due to shifts in the
supply and demand curves. Again, these dynamics have been well stud-
ied in the context of economics and sexual selection, but have received
far less attention in the context of cooperation and mutualism.
Sanctions, Power, and Partner Control
Although the biological market analogy can be extremely useful, biological
markets and their economic counterparts — at least as typically abstracted —
differ from one another in important ways. In standard neoclassical economic
theory, agents (e.g., buyers and sellers, employers and employees) are assumed
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Mutualist 1
Mutualist 2
By-product Purloined Invested
By-product Müllerian
mimicry
Origin of insect polli-
nation mutualisms
Ant–black
cherry tree
Purloined ? ?
Invested
?
(Reciprocal
altrusim)
Table 13.4 Mutualism may arise in different ways depending upon the nature of the
benefits exchanged. Traits that have evolved to benefit an individual directly may pro-
duce incidental or by-product benefits for others; individuals may extract benefits at a
cost to others (purloined), or individuals may invest in others at a cost to themselves. All
mutualisms may originate with one or both parties receiving by-product benefits, yield-
ing three different routes to mutualism (see text for discussion of the examples). If it were
discovered that the origin of any mutualism fell into one of the three categories that does
not include by-product benefits, including reciprocal altruism, Prediction 3 (see text)
would be falsified. Adapted from Connor (1995).
to be able to establish complete contracts. That is, individuals are able to make
fully binding commitments regarding the terms of any exchange, and these com-
mitments are enforceable at zero cost. By contrast, biological markets typically
offer no analogous way of establishing binding and freely enforceable contracts.
In the absence of complete contracts, the participants in market exchanges
have to bring about their desired outcomes by alternative means, for example, by
the strategic use of rewards for fulfilling an agreement or punishment for failing
to do so. The ability to make effective use of such strategic incentives is termed
power in recent economic models designed to address situations such as labor
agreements, in which contracts are not in practice complete (see Bowles and
Hammerstein, this volume). In short, we can describe power as follows:
We say that agent A has power over agent B if A can gain advantage over B by
threatening B with punishment, and B has no analogous counter-response.
With an example drawn from lazuli bunting mating systems, Bowles and
Hammerstein (this volume) illustrate the way in which power can be exerted in
biological systems. They find that in this system, models accounting for power
relations better explain the division of benefits among participants than do mod-
els based upon biological markets with complete contracts (see also Bergstrom
and Lachmann, this volume).
Models based on power can also account for observed inefficiencies in social
equilibria among animals that cannot be explained in a simple biological mar-
kets framework. Bowles and Hammerstein (unpublished manuscript) stress that
in biological markets or economic markets, when power is employed in lieu of
complete contracts and neither party has absolute power, equilibrium outcomes
will often be Pareto inefficient, because Pareto efficiency can often be obtained
only through trade with enforceable contracts. Although, in principle, these
ideas will apply to interspecific mutualisms, we stress that many current exam-
ples are drawn from intraspecific interactions: Bowles and Hammerstein exam-
ine the landlord-tenant system among lazuli bunting, Reuter and Keller (2001)
predict this sort of inefficiency arising from the exercise of power in
hymenopteran sex-ratio conflict, and of course the original economic theories
were derived to explain human intraspecific behavior.
PREDICTIONS
In the previous section, we briefly surveyed the current suite of conceptual tools
available to address the issues surrounding the evolution of mutualism. Each is
appealing in its own way, but how do we know which of these tools are right for
the job? How do we avoid driving nails with a screwdriver and turning bolts with
a hammer? Conceptual constructs can prove their utility by helping us organize
the facts that we already have collected, but often a stronger challenge can be
brought to bear upon our conceptual foundations through direct contact between
theory and empirical data (Hilborn and Mangel 1997).
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To bring about such an encounter, one requires that the theory generate test-
able predictions. In this spirit, we offer (and briefly motivate) a set of such pre-
dictions here. Rather than hedging our bets in mortal terror of possibly being
proven wrong at some future date, we have deliberately stated these predictions
in strong forms that are more likely than their timorous counterparts both to gen-
erate debate and to collapse ultimately under the weight of an accumulated body
of empirical evidence.
Prediction 1: Reciprocal altruism will never be observed in interspecific
mutualism. Reciprocal altruism requires both the presence of adequate cogni-
tive complexity to handle accounting and individual recognition as well as the
absence of alternative mechanisms sufficient to enforce mutualistic behavior.
We conjecture that this combination of circumstances will rarely, if ever, be
present in the interspecies associations that spawn interspecies mutualisms.
Prediction 2: Among organisms with relatively well-developed cognitive sys-
tems, many by-product mutualisms are the results of learning rather than the re-
sults of adaptation for that particular interaction. Therefore, if one partner is
replaced with some phylogenetically related and/or physiologically similar but
typically nonsympatric species, the individuals involved will be able to establish
mutually beneficial interactions despite the novelty of the partnership, and they
will be able to do so on the timescale of individual lifetimes.
Prediction 3: All interspecific mutualisms began, evolutionarily, from an asso-
ciation with by-product benefits to at least one party. Some by-product benefits
are necessary on at least one side in order to select for further development of the
interspecific association.
Prediction 4:Most mutualisms neither require nor exhibit sanctioning behavior
on the part of either partner. Partner choice and individually beneficial response
to undercontributing partners will be sufficient to motivate and enforce coopera-
tive behavior. Where mechanisms for imposing sanctions do exist, they will be
co-opted rather than evolved directly as sanctions.
PUZZLES
Thus far in our understanding of mutualism, a number of observations remain
baffling. Although, at this point, we cannot lay out a set of Hilbertian problems
for the study of mutualism, we would like to suggest the following puzzles as
possible areas of focus for future empirical and theoretical development.
Puzzle 1: Many mutualist partners appear to be quite poorly coadapted and
poorly fine-tuned to profit maximally from the mutualistic interaction. This is
surprising, given that opportunities for exploitation of mutualist partners appear
to be plentiful (Leimar and Connor, this volume; Bronstein, this volume). How
can we explain the limited success of mutualist partners in finding adaptive
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solutions to the problem of extracting maximal resources from the interspecific
interaction?
Puzzle 2: Why do adaptations for imposing sanctions on an interspecific
mutualist partner appear to be so rare? Individuals commonly engage in self-in-
terested behavior (e.g., switching partners when paired with a noncooperator),
which has the side effect of imposing costs on an uncooperative partner. (Could
we call this by-product punishment, in analogy to by-product mutualism?)
However, we rarely find examples in which an individual regulates or manipu-
lates the behavior of an interspecific partner behavior by actively imposing costs
on the partner at a direct cost to itself. Are there basic theoretical reasons why
such behaviors are unlikely to evolve, much as the evolution of intraspecific
punishment presents a free-rider problem (Frank 1995)? Is partner choice and/or
“by-product punishment” sufficiently effective such that selection is simply too
weak to generate active sanctioning? Are we failing to observe active sanction-
ing behavior even though it is present in a considerable number of systems? Is
sanctioning simply unnecessary, because the evolutionary process rarely gener-
ates the mutational combinations to produce variants capable of taking advan-
tage of their partners?
Puzzle 3:Why are mutualisms so commonly exploited by third parties, and why
do they so seldom have built-in mechanisms for the prevention of such exploita-
tion? Is the answer to this question more or less the same as the answer to Puzzle
2, or is dealing with “exploitation from outside” a fundamentally different sort
of evolutionary problem?
Puzzle 4: Mutualist partners often use signals to coordinate their actions and
contributions. What mechanisms (if any) prevent the evolution or persistence of
deceptive signaling strategies and the ultimate dissolution of the communica-
tion system? Should we expect these mechanisms to be similar to those involved
in the maintenance of intraspecific honest signaling?
By way of closing this section, we should note that each of these puzzles chal-
lenges the reader to explain a claim or pattern derived from our current assess-
ment of the body of empirical evidence. In any or all of these cases, the
resolution may lie in further theoretical or conceptual development; alterna-
tively, it is possible that our current assessment of the data is incorrect and that
the patterns around which the puzzles are founded could prove to be unsup-
ported. In either case, explicit theoretical models can serve to create the logical
framework in which to organize these data and address these puzzles. We hope
that these puzzles will serve to stimulate development of such models.
Model Systems and Experimental Tests
The field of mutualism biology has been blessed with a spectacular diversity of
field systems. However, the flip side of this lucky coin is that the particular
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systems that have received thorough attention thus far may be neither the most
representative of mutualistic interactions in general (see Bronstein, this vol-
ume), nor the most tractable for observational and experimental study. Although
no single system can capture the range of processes and phenomena observed
across all mutualisms, the development of a small number of model systems
could conceivably serve to accelerate progress in the field.
What makes a good model system? Clearly, this will depend on which ques-
tions one wishes to ask. In the study of nonobligate interspecific mutualism, we
are often particularly interested in the consequences of the parameters listed in
Table 13.1. Unfortunately, for most systems, many of these parameters either
cannot be, or have not been, quantified. As a result, quantitative prediction will
at best be difficult and at worst be a futile exercise in curve-fitting. We propose
an alternative approach: Within a particular model system, one can manipulate
these basic parameters and then observe the qualitative consequences. If one
were interested in the role of partner choice on the frequency of punishment be-
havior, one could manipulate partner availability on each side of a facultative
mutualism and measure the resulting changes in punishment frequency.
Another important consideration is the ability to perform experimental ma-
nipulations; potential model systems differ substantially in this respect. Some
are more easily brought into the laboratory than others. Obligate mutualisms
may be more difficult to manipulate broadly than facultative ones. Generation
times, and thus the potential for experimental evolution, vary by orders of mag-
nitude. So which systems would make good models? We propose two sets, cor-
responding to two timescales. Although this list is unavoidably biased toward
the inclusion of the research systems that we know the best, we hope that it can
nonetheless serve as a useful starting point.
Single-generation Experimental Manipulation
By observing short-term responses of species to changes in the behavior, condi-
tion, availability, and other characteristics of their mutualist partners, one can
explore possible answers to some of the major questions with which this report
began: How are mutualisms stabilized, and to what degree do species exhibit
adaptive plasticity in their responses to the specific circumstances of the
mutualism? However, a caveat is in order for studies of this kind. It will be cru-
cial to work with a system that exhibits natural variation in the parameters that
will be manipulated. Otherwise, one would not expect an evolved plasticity of
response to be manifested by members of the population.
Possible model systems:
1. Cleaner fish – client mutualism. In this volume, Bshary and Noë de-
scribe the cleaner fish – client mutualism, a strong candidate for study on
this timescale. The system has the notable advantage of being amenable
to both field and laboratory study. Moreover, the relatively advanced
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cognitive capabilities of the partners and evidence of extensive learning
suggests that this system may be a particularly good place to study the
role of cognitive function and learning mechanisms in the establishment
and maintenance of mutualism.
2. Ant–lycaenid systems. Evolutionary associations between ants and
lycaenid butterflies are some of the most extensive in terms of the num-
ber of species involved, with an estimated 4500 related species on the
lepidopteran side spanning the range of symbiotic associations from par-
asitism through mutualism (Pierce 1987, 2001; Pierce et al. 2002;
Bronstein, this volume) As such, this ensemble appears to be a particu-
larly promising system for comparative research. Because of the huge
number of species involved, this system also offers extraordinary poten-
tial for investigation of the underexplored relationships between phylog-
eny and mutualistic association; ongoing phylogenetic work by Pierce
and colleagues will provide the necessary background for such
investigations.
Experimental Evolution
Over the past decade, evolutionary biology has been deeply enriched by the de-
velopment of procedures and model systems allowing the experimental study of
evolution in real time in the laboratory. This approach would also seem to be
highly promising for the study of mutualism. Mutualistic interactions, including
biofilm formation, syntrophy, and various forms of environmental conditioning,
appear to be common in bacterial communities. Moreover, recent evidence of
interspecific bacterial signaling (Bassler 2002) strongly suggests coordinated
mutualistic activity.
Possible model systems:
1. Bacterial systems: Several investigators have developed laboratory
models of multispecies bacterial biofilms (see, e.g., Tolker-Nielsen and
Molin 2000); these could serve as useful evolutionary models. Bacterial
mutualisms — obligate or facultative — could also be constructed de
novo. An artificial obligate mutualism could be created by knocking out
complementary functions from two bacterial species so as to induce mu-
tual dependence in certain selective environments. Such a protocol
would allow the investigator to observe actually the initial steps in the
ontology of mutualism and to explore the role of the gene transfer in the
mutualism evolution. Moreover, biofilm systems are likely to provide
useful insight into the population dynamics and regulation of mutualist
partners.
2. Bacterium–plasmid associations: The interaction between bacteria and
their semi-autonomous, horizontally transferred plasmid molecules may
also merit consideration as a model system for the study of mutualism.
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Unlike bacteriophages and other parasitic replicons, plasmids most
likely enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship with their hosts. Current
theory and empirical work suggests that plasmids persist in bacterial
populations only when they actively benefit their hosts under at least
some environmental conditions (Bergstrom et al. 2000). Bacteria and
novel plasmids are known to exhibit rapid coevolution in response to one
another’s genetic makeup (Levin and Lenski 1983) and may also provide
interesting models of fitness compensation or even “addiction” in the ab-
sence of beneficial effects (Levin et al. 2000).
Other promising potential systems include plant–rhizobium interactions
(Denison 2000), cnidarian–algae symbioses (Baghdasarian and Muscatine
2000), and bacterial–insect (Moran 2001) or bacterial–nematode associations
(Burnell and Stock 2000).
CONCLUSION: WHY STUDY MUTUALISM?
To date, the study of mutualism has proceeded largely out of a desire to explore
the extraordinary natural histories of mutualist species and mutualistic associa-
tions. This remains a fascinating area, a rich and still proportionally uncharted
territory. In addition, there are further reasons why the study of mutualism will
serve to address important, basic issues in ecology and evolutionary biology.
First, the study of interspecific mutualistic associations offers the opportu-
nity to explore the mechanisms — from sanctioning to partner choice to
pseudroreciprocity — that maintain cooperative behavior even in the absence of
kin selection. These mechanisms are likely to be of fundamental importance as
guarantors of prosocial behavior not only in interspecific interactions through-
out the tree of life, but also in the human (intraspecific) interactions among
nonkin that are ubiquitous in large modern societies (McElreath et al., this vol-
ume; Henrich et al., this volume).
Second, many of the major transitions in evolution (Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry 1995) have involved the formation of mutually beneficial associa-
tions that ultimately became new levels of organization. A more detailed under-
standing of the origin and ontogeny of interspecific mutualisms can further help
our efforts to understand the most important occurrences in the history of life.
Third, the study of mutualism to date has focused on the dyadic relationship
between partner–species pairs. Of course, each of these pairwise species inter-
actions is in fact embedded in a larger community-level context. To understand
the function of mutualistic systems fully, we will have to understand the commu-
nity-level context as well. As such, the study of mutualism dynamics should
stimulate the development of additional connections between ecological and
evolutionary processes and timescales. Ultimately, studies of multispecies phe-
nomena that build upon mutualism should have significance for conserving and
restoring species in a rapidly changing world.
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